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In this issue of Neuron, Fried et al. report electrical recordings from single neurons in several areas of the
humanmedial frontal lobe prior to voluntary movement. These data shed important new light on the neuronal
mechanisms of human volition and on the hotly debated relation between consciousness and will.Introduction
Few issues in neuroscience attract such
wide interest as the brain basis of ‘‘free
will.’’ We all have the strong belief that
we make choices about what we do and
that our conscious decisions initiate our
actions, at least on some occasions. At
the same time, our actions are clearly
the result of a causal chain of neuronal
activity in premotor and motor areas
of the brain. Neuroscience has few
convincing experimental methods to
study the brain processes that precede
voluntary action. The few published data
available often use recording methods
such as fMRI that give only crude or indi-
rect pictures of neuronal activity.
To date, the field has been dominated
by the ‘‘Libet experiment’’ (Libet et al.,
1983). In this experiment, participants
are asked to make a simple voluntary
action, such as a key press, whenever
they feel like it. Brain activity is measured
throughout, originally using EEG and
more recently using fMRI (Lau et al.,
2004). At the same time, they observe a
rotating clock hand and are asked to
note the position of the clock when they
first experience the conscious intention,
or ‘‘feel the urge,’’ to press the key. This
hotly debatedmarker of volition is referred
to asW (judgment of will, following Libet’s
terminology). EEG activity over frontal
motor areas began 1 s or more before
movement (the so-called ‘‘readiness
potential’’ [Kornhuber andDeecke, 1965]),
while W occurred much later, a few
hundred ms before movement itself.
These findings raise important questions
about the brain events that initiate
voluntary actions and their relation to
consciousness. Although the Libet exper-
iment was published almost 30 years ago,
it is still serves as a nexus in the neurosci-
ence of volition.404 Neuron 69, February 10, 2011 ª2011 ElsThe paper by Fried, Mukamel, and Krei-
man (Fried et al., 2011) offers a genuinely
new perspective on volition. The key
contribution comes from the nature of
the data themselves. In some cases of
intractable epilepsy, intracranial elec-
trodes are used for evaluation prior to
neurosurgery. When depth electrodes
are inserted into the cortical tissue itself,
it is then possible to record the firing
patterns of single neurons in awake,
behaving humans. The potential value of
these kinds of data for understanding
cognition cannot be underestimated.
Fried and colleagues reprised the Libet
experiment while recording from elec-
trodes in medial frontal areas in 12
epileptic patients. These areas generate
the scalp readiness potentials recorded
prior to voluntary movement. Moreover,
stimulation of these areas has been re-
ported to generate a feeling of urge to
move a particular body part, without
necessarily causing actual movement
(Fried et al., 1991). Therefore, direct
recordings from medial frontal neurons




First, the single-neuron data provide a re-
assuring confirmation of previous studies
that recorded neural populations. A rela-
tively small subset of medial frontal
neurons showed a gradual ramp-like
increase in firing rate before movement
that recalls both EEG readiness potentials
and recordings prior to memory-guided
actions in trained monkeys (Shima and
Tanji, 2000). The time of conscious inten-
tion could be predicted from small
subpopulations of these neurons, using
an integrate-and-fire model, well before
the time that participants reported theevier Inc.experience of volition. Of course, the time
of conscious intention is closely linked to
the time of action itself, so it is difficult to
separate the relation between medial
frontal activity and conscious intention
from the relation between medial frontal
activity and voluntary action. In fact, these
data give the impression that conscious
intention is just a subjective corollary of
an action being about to occur. Such
models agree with previous accounts
that voluntary actions begin uncon-
sciously and enter into our conscious
experience only when medial frontal
activity has reachedagiven threshold level
of activity (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008).
In this sense, the current work is in broad
agreement with a general trend in neuro-
science of volition: althoughwemay expe-
rience that our conscious decisions and
thoughts cause our actions, these experi-
ences are in fact based on readouts of
brain activity in a network of brain areas
that control voluntary action.
The novelty of this study, however, lies
in the fine grain of detail that it gives about
the mechanisms of volitional action. This
knowledge fills important gaps that are
intrinsic to methods used previously:
EEG recordings in humans lacked spatial
precision, neuroimaging studies lacked
fine temporal precision, and single-unit
recording studies in animals lacked any
conscious dimension. It is worth summa-
rizing some of the specific details in Fried
et al.’s data and considering their implica-
tions for neuroscience of human volition.
Involvement of Different Medial
Frontal Areas in Coding for Volition
These data provide perhaps the first
opportunity to compare the contributions
of several different medial frontal areas
to volition. Here, there are some inter-
esting surprises. For some years, the
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located immediately anterior to themedial
part of the primarymotor cortex, has been
divided into pre-SMA rostrally and SMA
proper more caudally. The pre-SMA was
considered to be involved primarily in
movement planning, while the SMA
proper was considered an execution
area, since it sends axons to the spinal
cord (Picard and Strick, 1996). These
arguments lead many researchers to link
the pre-SMA both to voluntary action
and to the experience of volition itself.
Indeed, pre-SMA was activated in an
fMRI study of the Libet task (Lau et al.,
2004) and was identified as the source
of readiness potentials from subdural
recordings (Yazawa et al., 2000).
However, Fried et al.’s data interestingly
show a very different pattern. SMA proper
contained relatively more neurons active
before W than did the pre-SMA. In
contrast, rather few SMA proper neurons
were active in the brief interval between
W and movement onset relative to the
pre-SMA. A quick statistical test on the
proportions of each type of unit in
the two areas shows a significant differ-
ence in the distributions (c2(1) = 4. 13,
p = 0.042). Importantly, the difference is
in the opposite direction from that sug-
gested by neuroimaging and EEG studies.
This finding suggests a revision of howwe
interpret the W judgment. It is clearly
wrong to think of W as a prior intention,
located at the very earliest moment of
decision in an extended action chain.
Rather, W seems to mark an intention-
in-action, quite closely linked to action
execution. The experience of conscious
intention may correspond to the point at
which the brain transforms a prior plan
into a motor act through changes in
activity of SMA proper.
Medial Frontal Neurons whose
Firing Decreases Prior to Volition
A second striking finding is the prevalence
of cells that are clearly associated with
voluntary action, but whose firing rate
decreases progressively prior to W. Other
methods, such as EEG and neuroimaging,
presumably register an aggregated sig-
nal, reflecting activity of both ‘‘increasing’’
and ‘‘decreasing’’ neurons. Again, there
are interesting differences between the
areas recorded, with decreasing neurons
being more common than increasingneurons in the rostral anterior cingulate
and also in the pre-SMA. The function of
decreasing neurons remains unclear. Of
course, the increasing/decreasing pro-
files could reflect a simple additional
computational transformation: a single
inhibitory interneuron could transform
information between one pattern and the
other.
At the same time, it is tempting to take
decreasing neurons as evidence for an
intrinsically inhibitory component of voli-
tion. Several classes of evidence suggest
that suppression of action and voluntary
initiation are profoundly linked in the
medial frontal cortex. First, lesions in this
region can produce anarchic hand and
utilization behavior involving unwanted,
compulsive actions in response to envi-
ronmental stimuli (Boccardi et al., 2002).
This suggests that an important normal
function of these areasmay be to tonically
inhibit unwanted actions. Second,
a recent neuroimaging study showed
increased pre-SMA activation when an
external stop signal successfully triggered
inhibition of movement (Sharp et al.,
2010). Finally, and compellingly, medial
frontal areas that produced movement
arrest during intracranial stimulation
were also identified as the source of read-
iness potentials during action generation
(Yazawa et al., 2000). A recent model of
volition identified the decision of whether
to act or not as an important component
of volition (Brass and Haggard, 2008).
Fried et al.’s data suggest one mecha-
nism that might be involved in this deci-
sion. Decreasing neurons might withhold
actions until they become appropriate
through tonic inhibition and then help to
trigger voluntary actions by gradually
removing this tonic inhibition. Competitive
inhibitory interaction between decreasing
and increasing neurons could then
provide a circuit for resolving whether to
act or withhold action. A similar model
has already been proposed for decisions
between alternative stimulus-driven
actions in lateral premotor cortex (Cisek,
2007). Libet thought that ‘‘veto decisions’’
could represent a form of pure mind-brain
causation, with consciousness directly
intervening to interrupt the buildup of the
readiness potential. Competition between
populations of medial frontal neuronsmay
provide a simpler explanation, though it
still leaves us hunting for potential ‘‘deci-Neuron 69,sion’’ areas that may modulate the
competition.
Outstanding Questions for the
Neuroscience of Volition
Not surprisingly, several questions remain
unanswered. One is the possible contri-
bution to volition of other cortical areas
not studied here. Fried et al. highlight
recent reports of an experience of urge
to move following parietal stimulation
(Desmurget et al., 2009). They briefly
present one parietal recording from their
own data set, which shows an increase
in firing rate prior to W very similar to
medial frontal neurons. The division of
labor between medial frontal and parietal
cortex in volition is a topic of current
debate. Neuropsychological studies of
patients with focal frontal and parietal
lesions suggest that both areas are
involved in volition (Haggard, 2008). It
seems likely that they act as a concerted
network: the pre-SMA might generate
action plans, and the parietal cortex might
monitor their progression to execution.
However, we have little insight into the
detailed operation of this network. In
neurosurgical studies, the sites of stimu-
lation and placement of recording elec-
trodes are, of course, determined by clin-
ical need alone. Therefore, the crucial
data required to resolve the debate,
such as simultaneous recordings from
parietal and frontal electrodes in the
same individual, may not be forthcoming.
A second remaining question is the
activity of these neurons in the absence
of voluntary action. The technique used
here, as in other voluntary action experi-
ments, involves ‘‘back-averaging’’ neural
activity time-locked to a motor response.
This technique suggests that medial
frontal cortex activity is a necessary
condition for voluntary action. However,
we cannot tell if medial frontal activity is
sufficient for action. In fact, we know little
about neuronal activity in these areas
when no voluntary actions occur. The
presence of medial frontal or prefrontal
BOLD responses when successfully stop-
ping a voluntary action in response to
a stop signal (Sharp et al., 2010) or an
internal decision (Brass and Haggard,
2008) suggests that neuronal firing may
not be sufficient for action. In principle,
buildup of activity in areas such as pre-
SMA could occur very frequently, but theFebruary 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 405
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Previewsfiring trajectory could be prevented from
continuing toward voluntary action for
some unknown reason.
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